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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2882 
___________ 
 
CAROLINE ELDRIDGE, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MUNICIPALITY OF NORRISTOWN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-02143) 
District Judge:  Honorable Anita B. Brody 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 5, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  March 6, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In May 2010, Caroline Eldridge filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against her former employer, the 
Municipality of Norristown, alleging that her termination was the result of disparate 
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treatment and retaliation in violation of, inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act (PHRA), 43 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 et seq.  Norristown moved for summary judgment, asserting that 
Eldridge’s termination was the result of her substandard performance.  In November 
2011, the District Court granted Norristown’s motion on Eldridge’s retaliation claims, but 
permitted her disparate treatment claims to go forward.  Following a jury trial in June 
2012, judgment was entered in Norristown’s favor on the disparate treatment claims as 
well.  Eldridge, proceeding pro se, now seeks review of the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment to Norristown on her retaliation claims.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  In February 2007, Norristown hired Eldridge, an African-American 
female, as a Human Resources (HR) manager.  David Forrest, a Caucasian male, became 
Eldridge’s supervisor in May 2007.  The relationship between Forrest and Eldridge 
progressively deteriorated as a result of several incidents in the workplace.  Forrest 
ultimately terminated Eldridge in February 2009. 
 In her amended complaint, Eldridge claimed that she was terminated in retaliation 
for three specific incidents.  The first incident took place in April 2008, when Forrest 
held a counseling session with Eldridge to review certain conduct in the workplace that 
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he found inappropriate.  After the counseling session, Eldridge filed a complaint against 
Forrest alleging that he had reprimanded her because of her race and gender.1
 The next two incidents occurred when Eldridge “reported what she perceived in 
good faith to be violations of the federal and state civil rights law[s] concerning other 
employees.”  (Am. Compl., dkt # 20, ¶ 69.)  First, at some point during her employment 
with Norristown, Eldridge learned that another employee, Devon Vann, may have been 
engaging in criminal activity while on the job.  Eldridge soon learned that Vann had a 
criminal history.  When Eldridge relayed this information to Forrest, he instructed her to 
obtain a copy of Vann’s criminal record.  According to Eldridge, she then expressed 
concern to Forrest that Norristown’s attempt to obtain Vann’s criminal record – which 
was evidently a juvenile record – was a violation of his civil rights. 
 
The second time Eldridge reported a “civil rights” violation was in February 2009, 
shortly before she was terminated.  That month, Norristown posted a job opening for a 
secretarial position in the police department.  Sharnel Pearson and Danielle Hodo, two 
African-American women who were employed by Norristown in other positions, applied 
for the job.  On February 10, 2009, Eldridge, along with three other employees, 
interviewed the candidates.  Two days later, Eldridge sent an email to Forrest expressing 
concern about some of the questions that were posed to Hodo, but not to Pearson.  
According to Eldridge, certain questions delved too deeply into Hodo’s personal 
                                              
1 Norristown hired outside counsel to investigate Eldridge’s allegations of 
discrimination.  Counsel ultimately concluded that Eldridge’s allegations were baseless. 
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experience with the police department.  Eldridge stated that “[i]t is very important that we 
remain consistent on how we conduct ourselves while interviewing.  I am concerned that 
[Hodo]’s civil liberties were violated.”  (Appellee’s Supp. App. 0016.)  Forrest and 
Police Chief Russell Bono later informed Eldridge that they had serious concerns about 
Hodo because of her criminal history and other negative interactions with the police, and 
told Eldridge that she was undermining the municipality by advocating for Hodo. 
According to Eldridge, Norristown ultimately terminated her in retaliation for her 
actions during these incidents. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment, using the 
same standard applied by the District Court.  See Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 
174 (3d Cir. 2011).  Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant demonstrates 
“that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
The District Court properly analyzed Eldridge’s retaliation claims under Title VII 
according to the familiar burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).2
                                              
2 The District Court did not analyze Eldridge’s state-law retaliation claim 
separately because, as it correctly noted, the PHRA is construed consistently with 
interpretations of Title VII.  See Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 
1084 (3d Cir. 1995). 
  See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 
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403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999).  Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Eldridge bore the 
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of a Title VII violation.  See McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  If she succeeded, the burden then would shift to Norristown to 
“articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for her termination.  See id.  
Eldridge would then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the legitimate reason for her termination offered by Norristown was a pretext.  See 
Jones, 198 F.3d at 410. 
To establish a prima facie claim of unlawful retaliation, Eldridge was required to 
show that:  (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) Norristown took an 
adverse action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected 
activity and the adverse action taken.  See Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Title VII defines a protected activity as, inter alia, an instance where an 
employee has opposed a discriminatory employment practice based upon an individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1); 2000e-3(a). 
 In its motion for summary judgment, Norristown argued that Eldridge had failed 
to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she had not demonstrated that she 
was terminated as a result of a protected activity.  In response, Eldridge maintained that 
the February 12, 2009 email she sent to Forrest expressing concern about the Hodo 
interview was protected activity, and that the proximity in time between the email and her 
termination – less than one week – established the requisite causal connection.  We agree 
with the District Court that Eldridge’s email does not constitute protected activity under 
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Title VII.  Although the email raised a general concern about the propriety – even legality 
– of certain questions posed to Hodo, it did not allege any type of discrimination 
recognized by Title VII.  Indeed, the record reflects that the comparator candidate, 
Pearson, was also an African-American female.  Therefore, the District Court correctly 
concluded that Eldridge failed to establish the first prong of her prima facie retaliation 
case.3
 On appeal, Eldridge complains that the District Court failed to consider whether 
the other incidents she cited in support of her retaliation claims – namely, the allegations 
of discrimination she made in June 2008, and her email expressing concern about the 
propriety of requesting Vann’s criminal record – constituted protected activity.  It appears 
that the District Court declined to consider these incidents in the context of her retaliation 
  See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“A general complaint of unfair treatment is insufficient to establish 
protected activity under Title VII.”); Cf. Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 701-
02 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that letter to HR complaining that position was given to less 
qualified candidate was not protected activity under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act because it did not explicitly or implicitly allege that age was the basis 
for the adverse employment action). 
                                              
3 To the extent that Eldridge argues that summary judgment was inappropriate 
because there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether her February 12, 2009 email 
alleged discrimination, we disagree.  We have reviewed the email and conclude that no 
reasonable juror could have found that the email alleged discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
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claim because Eldridge did not address them in her counseled brief in opposition to 
Norristown’s summary judgment motion.  We see no error in this regard.  See Saldana v. 
Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that the party opposing 
summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations of the complaint, but must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial).  In any event, we have 
reviewed the record and conclude that, even considering these incidents, Eldridge failed 
to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.  First, like the email that Eldridge sent to 
Forrest about the Hodo interview, the email she sent about Vann’s background is not 
protected activity because it did not allege any discrimination.  Furthermore, while 
Eldridge’s allegations of race and gender discrimination in June 2008 could be 
considered protected activity, they are not linked to her subsequent termination through 
temporal proximity or a sufficient record of ongoing antagonism.  See Woodson v. Scott 
Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920–21 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]emporal proximity . . . is sufficient 
to establish the causal link. . . .  [A] plaintiff can [also] establish a link between his or her 
protected behavior and subsequent discharge if the employer engaged in a pattern of 
antagonism in the intervening period.”).  Accordingly, because Eldridge failed to 
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the District Court properly granted summary 
judgment to Norristown on her claims under Title VII and the PHRA.4
                                              
4 Because we conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment 
to Norristown on Eldridge’s retaliation claims, we need not reach Norristown’s argument 
on appeal that Eldridge should be estopped from arguing that race or gender were 
determinative factors in her termination. 
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
Norristown’s motion for summary judgment. 
